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Counterfeiting Dali and Other Artists:
The Art of Surrealist Deception
I.

Introduction
Picture it: socialites at elegant auctions in Manhattan, bidding on elite, expensive

pieces of art with small, numbered paddles. This was the quintessential version of art acquisition
for decades. Over time, this method of transferring fine art has become less glamorous and more
obsolete as other, more efficient methods of acquiring art work have come to fruition. Art is a
tangible, movable thing--, a good, a finite resource. Plenty of copies, authorized or not, may be
created, but there is a limited number of originals available for purchase.
Several types of venues facilitate the sale of art. Traditional venues include auction
houses such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s. Christie’s was founded in 1766, and remains one of the
leading auction houses in the world, pricing items from $200 to $80 million.1 Sotheby’s, the
other leading auction house, was founded in 1744 and has sold billions of dollars worth of
merchandise to date, including the Star of the Season diamond for approximately $16.5 million
in 1995.2 Newer platforms of selling art work include small businesses and of course, the
internet. The internet has caused much heated debate over art forgery.3 eBay has acted as the
host for some of the most sought after con artists of today.4 Though eBay attempts to control the
counterfeit art registered on its site, buyers still have a chance to purchase this art before eBay
can effectively intervene. 5 Because venues have yet to find fully effective methods of
preventing art forgery, it remains one of the most lucrative illegal activities, third only to drug
smuggling and arms dealing. 6
Counterfeit art takes its fair toll on the economy. Regardless of whether the infringement
is innocent or intentional, the economic consequences remain constant. Flooding the market
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with counterfeit works artificially decreases the prices of authentic original pieces of art.7
Notwithstanding the economic impact of forged art, there are social and communal consequences
as well. In many instances, forged art is unloaded on unsuspecting tourists visiting a foreign
country. Occasionally, the victims are unsophisticated and inexperienced art buyers.8 The issue
remains, how to protect consumers’ and artists’ rights in a world where counterfeiting art is a
low-risk, high-reward crime.9
Criminal prosecution bears a high burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, and intent
is a requirement for conviction.10 Civil actions are also unlikely to prove fruitful since, typically,
the counterfeiter does not have the capital to satisfy the judgment. Moreover, many buyers
simply rely on a dealer’s reputation instead of hiring an independent expert, which in turn makes
novice buyers frequent victims of fraud.11
This paper will serve to explain why the existing federal and state protections against
selling forged art are insufficient. First, there will be a discussion regarding the federal statutes,
then state protections, and finally a proposed solution to the shortcomings of the existing legal
protections and consequences of profiting from counterfeited art work. The creation of
counterfeit art is beyond the scope of this paper. The concern here is centered on those who
profit from selling counterfeit art and those harmed by this practice. Whether the counterfeit
work originated with the original artist or the artist sold the counterfeit art to another who knew
or should have known the work was counterfeit is irrelevant because the end result is still fraud.
II.

Federal Protections: “Good Artists Copy, Great Artists Steal.”—Picasso
a. Copyright Concerns
Several federal statutes purport to protect artists’ and consumers’ rights in some fashion.

They include: the Copyright Statute, 12 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
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(“RICO”) statute,13 the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC’),14 the Trademark and Trade
Dress statutes ,15 the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”),16 and the National Stolen
Property Act (“NSPA”).17
Under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, “the Congress shall have
the Power…. [T]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing and limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”18 To
qualify for copyright protection under this statute the work must be of a copyrightable subject
matter, fixed in a tangible medium of expression and must have originated with the author.
Works that fall outside the durational provision provided in 17 U.S.C. §102(a) are in the public
domain and therefore are not protected by this statute.19
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “public domain” as “the universe of inventions and
creative works that are not protected by intellectual property rights and are therefore available for
anyone to use without charge.”20 Any work created before the 1909 Copyright Act21 is in the
public domain as well as any work where the copyright has lapsed. Another alarming issue with
copyright protection particularly in the realm of the art world, is the fact that copyrights do not
automatically transfer with the sale of a work.22 The copyright protection originates with the
author of the work. This right may be transferred or assigned; however, the transfer is not
automatic upon the sale of the tangible work itself.23
For works protected under the 1909 Copyright Act, the copyright endured for an initial
period of 28 years plus a renewal period of 28 years and if the author failed to renew the
copyright, the work was injected into the public domain.24 This Act leaves an inordinate amount
of art work unprotected and therefore in the public domain. Works created before 192325 enjoy
no copyright protection. Works such as Michelangelo’s David or Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona
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Lisa are not entitled to copyright protection because they were created before the 1909 Copyright
Act, thus these works of art are in the public domain and high susceptible to art forgery. Because
the work is in the public domain, another cause of action is eliminated and this contributes to art
forgery being classified as a low-risk, high-reward crime. If one was sold a counterfeit work that
falls outside the scope of protection, he would have to rely on another cause of action because he
would not own the copyright to the work of art in the public domain.
Under the 1976 Copyright Act works created on or after January 1, 1978 are entitled to a
copyright period for the life of the author plus 50 years.26 When considering the copyright of a
joint work, copyright protection lasts for the life of the last surviving author plus 70 years.27
Copyright protection lasts 95 years from the first publication or 120 years from its creation,
whichever expires first for anonymous works, works created under pseudonyms, and works
created by a corporation.28 Moreover, in 1998, the Sonny Bono amendment was passed
extending the duration of a copyright by 20 years, effectively extending the copyright protection
from the life of the author plus 50 years to the life of the author plus 70 years.29
Museums have concerns regarding the copyrightable images that the museum has secured
of a work of art. According to the associate general counsel of the Museum of Modern Art
(“MoMA”), Henry Lanman, the MoMA restricts distribution of the high resolution photographs
taken of art works.30 Art works that are displayed in the MoMA are transported to a studio in
Queens, New York to be photographed. This arduous process takes several days and high
resolution cameras are used to procure the best quality photograph possible. There are no
restrictions on visitors taking pictures with a personal camera once inside the museum because
the quality of the picture could not possibly rise to the level of quality that would be competitive
with the photos taken at the Queens location.31
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Mr. Lanman has experience with forged labels that are affixed to the art works. Every
time a work is displayed in the MoMA, a label is placed on the work identifying that the MoMA
has displayed it. This label is valuable because it bolsters the authentication of the work, if it is
under question. Mr. Lanman said, “a couple times a year we receive calls from galleries or
dealers researching a work that has a label indicting it was on loan or owned by MoMA…people
try to forge labels all the time, dealers looking for an answer of authentication will scan the label,
send it to me, and I will authenticate it, but it is pretty obvious when it is a fake, there have never
been any close calls.”32 The label is part of the provenance which is the chain of ownership that
should accompany each valuable work of art. A genuine label affixed to the back of a work
indicates the work is genuine. In addition to authenticating forged labels, Mr. Lanman does
manage the MoMA’s copyright claims to certain works.
Mr. Lanman also posited “museums usually do not own copyrights of the work, but they
do assert copyrights in the images of the work taken in high definition usually for the purpose of
merchandise in the museum gift shop. This type of assertion is very frequent and the museum
controls access to the physical object then issues licenses in the high definition photographs.”
Mr. Lanman described the insurance process for stolen art. “Insurance policies are
written in such a way to allow recovery of art work; for example, let’s say in 1970 a work was
insured for $10,000, and that amount was paid out to the museum after the work was stolen.
Then in 2012, the work is recovered and now worth now $500,000, the question becomes, who
owns the work of art. Many insurance policies will allow the insured to repay the proceeds and
premiums to recover the work.” Mr. Lanman then explained the purpose of stealing art in the
first place. Obviously, any art dealer would know or come to find out the work was stolen. Mr.
Lanman responded, “There is essentially no art market for stolen work, except for black markets
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that would maybe trade the art work for another illicit commodity and the art work be sold at a
fraction of its real value.”33
b. Defenses to Copyright Infringement
Several defenses to copyright claims exist, including: the innocent infringer defense,34 de
minimus taking,35 fair use,36 independent creation,37 and parody.38 The “innocent infringer”
defense is available if the infringers were not aware or had no reason to believe that their acts
constituted infringement. If the plaintiff registered the copyright, that notice of copyright makes
this defense unavailable to defendants. The de minimus defense contains three components
necessary for analysis: 1) a technical violation so trivial that the law will not impose legal
consequences, 2) copying has occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative
threshold of substantial similarity, 3) relevant to fair use [the amount of substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole].39 The fair use defense uses a four
factor test, 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole and 4) the effect
on the potential market for the value of the copyrighted work.40 The Independent creation
defense indicates that the infringer had no previous exposure or access to the work he is being
accused of infringing upon.41 For a parody defense to be successful the copy must be poking fun
at the original work and the primary use must not be commercial.42 However, in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music the Supreme Court held that parody could be a fair use and thus not subject to
copyright infringement, and a commercial use was not presumptively unfair since that
presumption would render the fair use defense effectively useless.43 In addition, the parody
“must make some critical comment or statement about the original work which reflects the
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original perspective of the parodist -- thereby giving the parody social value beyond its
entertainment function.”44
c. Other federal protections
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute creates criminal and civil
liability for acts performed as part of a continuing criminal organization. Specifically, the statute
creates liability for the different ranking leaders of groups of organized crime. The relevant
statutes of the RICO provisions include § 472 45 and § 473.46 Successful RICO cases are far and
few between, because the standard of prosecution is very high. This statute is insufficient to
protect consumers who fall victim to art forgers.
The Federal Trade Commission Act47 is another federal protection afforded to prevent
unfair trade practices. Federal Trade Commission Act attempts to essentially prevent unfair
trade practices that affect commerce. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered “to (a)
prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c)
prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or
deceptive…”48 In one case where the FTC Act was utilized, Salvatore Dali signed blank sheets
of paper to have his works reprinted on them because he was in poor health and soon would be
unable to write his signature.49 The publishing company then forged more of Dali’s signatures to
sell more Dali works and the defendant earned millions from these forged Dali prints.50 This act
would constitute an unfair and deceptive act affecting commerce and therefore the defendants
would be liable under the FTC Act. This statute is vague regarding the characterization of unfair
trade practices and the appropriate remedy to protect consumers is not clearly defined here.
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Typically, trademark statutes cannot afford protection to artists because no trademark
exists within the work and their signature on art work itself does not constitute a trademark.51 A
trademark is a “word, phrase, symbol or design, or a combination of words, phrases, symbols or
designs, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods of one party from those of
others.” 52 The Lanham Act bars individuals from reproducing or imitating a registered
trademark in connection with a sale of a product that is likely to cause confusion to a consumer
or account for dilution of that trademark.53 Despite this protection, no damages may be
recovered by the registrant of the trademark unless there is intent to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.54 Again, this makes counterfeiting art work, which may be otherwise
protected by trademark, a lucrative, low-risk offense since intent must be proven before damages
can be awarded. Another trademark statute protects against false designation of origin.55 In
other words, this statute creates liability for those who falsely claim a work is authentic.56 An
example would be if an artist actually signed blank sheets of paper which his work is to be
reprinted and the publisher sold these prints as originals instead of authorized signed copies.57
Trade dress may act as another federal protection to art work. Trade dress is the design
and shape of the materials in which a product is packaged.58 “Product configuration, the design
and shape of the product itself, may also be considered a form of trade dress.”59 The Lanham
Act protects trade dress if it serves the same source-identifying function as a trademark. It is
possible to register trade dress as a trademark, but for practical reasons most trade dress and
product configurations are protected without registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).60 This
protection may be difficult to utilize, because most art works would typically not fit within the
description of the definition of trade dress.
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The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”) protects artists’ moral rights and
provides for selected artists’ rights in their work regardless of ownership later in time.61 An
artist’s moral rights essentially protect the work from being bastardized or distorted in anyway.62
“The term ‘moral rights’ has its origins in the civil law and is a translation of the French le droit
moral, which captures those rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature.”63 VARA,
affords protection only to authors of works of visual art.64
The statute also includes a negative definition of works falling outside the scope of
narrow protection.65 American copyright laws do not give rise to a cause of action for
mutilation of an artist’s work or the presentation of the work that is portrayed to the public.
American courts have used contract law and the law of unfair competition to provide this
protection.66 VARA allows for a cause of action protecting artists’ moral rights offering
protection on which the authors’ livelihood depends. VARA only offers protection to artists, not
copyright holders generally, therefore the breadth of VARA’s protection is very narrow. For
example, if artist A sells his painting to buyer B, VARA only protects artist A’s rights and not
buyer B’s rights.
Another federal criminal statute used in prosecuting is the National Stolen Property Act.67
This Act provides for criminal liability for any person who “transports, transmits, or transfers in
interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value
of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud . . .."68
This statute is used for stolen property generally, not just works of art. In addition, the value of
the property must be at least $5,000 in order for criminal liability to attach, leaving victims of art
forgery that lose less than $5,000 vulnerable and not protected by this statute.
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III.

State Protections
The broadest of state protections to protect art work stems from the state adopted

Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”). Karl Llewellyn served as the principle drafter of the
U.C.C. and this code serves to codify the law of sales and other commercial transactions.69 Here,
the focus of consumer protection circles around Article 2 of the U.C.C. which governs the sale of
goods.70 The U.C.C. proposes several remedies for those victims of art forgery which include in
part: breach of contract and warranties.
The U.C.C. provides several bases for breach of contract for causes of action based on
fraud, duress, unconscionability and others. For example, if patrons relied to their detriment in
purchasing a work of art that they were led to believe was authentic when negotiating the
contract. If that work turned out to be fake that would establish a breach of contract induced by
fraud. A specific prohibition against selling unauthorized works of art lies in U.C.C. §2-312.71
This provision states that “title conveyed shall be good and its transfer rightful and shall not
unreasonably expose the buyer to litigation because of any colorable claim to or interest in the
goods.”72 In this regard, sellers cannot sell art work if they themselves do not know the rightful
owner of the work. This is particularly helpful in cases of stolen art work, since the title may
belong to a previous, rightful owner and the victim was a good faith bona fide purchaser. The
bona fide owner could maintain a claim against the seller of the work under U.C.C. §2-312.
Liability is created when a seller gives a buyer an express warranty about the goods being
tendered. For example, if a seller on eBay describes a work of art as authentic, that may be
considered an express warranty. This liability can be enforced under U.C.C. §2-313.73
Specifically, the portion of the statute applicable in the previous example is “[A]ny affirmation
of fact or promise made by the seller which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
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the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.”74 In this example, the seller expressly stated that the work is authentic and therefore
not a copy. If the work is found to be counterfeit, the buyer may bring a claim under U.C.C. §2313 for breach of express warranty.
A colorable claim regarding the breach of implied warranties may exist as well. If
Christie’s auctions a Picasso worth $50 million dollars, the buyer may infer that this Picasso is
genuine and has been authenticated by an expert. This claim may be brought under U.C.C. §2314(2) (c) where the warranty implies that the good is fit for its ordinary purpose, which also
may be interpreted as the good is authentic.75 Another claim may be brought under U.C.C. §2314(3) where implied warranties of merchantability are created by the course of dealing or usage
in the trade.76 Over time, Christie’s has established a reputation for selling priceless art work.
Christie’s provided an implied warranty of merchantability in this hypothetical because a world
renowned auction house would presumably not sell a fake Picasso for $50 million dollars.
Another state protection is the Consumer Fraud Act. Each state has a similar statute
protecting consumers from fraudulent sales of goods.77 This Act typically extends express
warranties about the work's authenticity and prohibits material misrepresentation or omissions.78
Whenever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes to a
buyer of such work who is not an art merchant a certificate of authenticity or any similar
written instrument it:
(a) Shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain; and
(b) Shall create an express warranty for the material facts stated as of the date of such
sale or exchange.79

Here, the New York Consumer Fraud Act analog to the Federal Trade Commission Act is
§13.01 Express Warranties in the New York Consolidated Laws Service.80 Express warranties
that are presumed to be a basis of the bargain are created. However, this statute only applies to
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art merchants, thus the seller must be in the business of selling art to be found liable under this
statute.81
There are several criminal causes of action that the state may bring against a seller of
counterfeit or stolen art. First and most frequently utilized to prosecute art forgery is the crime
of larceny. New York’s statute reads “a person steals property and commits larceny when, with
intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” 82 A person
commits larceny when he or she intentionally takes the property of another.83 If an individual
steals a piece of artwork then resells it, it would constitute a second crime of larceny in addition
to the original crime of stealing the work.84 The statute goes on to state:
Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property, with
the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section, committed in any of the following
ways: (a) By conduct heretofore defined or known as common law larceny by trespassory
taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false
pretenses; (b) By acquiring lost property.85
Reselling stolen artwork would constitute larceny by deceit. Specifically, a person
commits grand larceny in the fourth degree if “[T]he property, regardless of its nature and value,
is taken from the person of another.”86 A crime that an offender may typically be charged with is
possession of stolen property. Even if the criminal does not intend to resell what he or she has
stolen, simply possessing the stolen property is an actionable crime.87 Possession of stolen
property ranges from first to fifth degrees depending on the monetary amount the goods that
were stolen are worth.88 “A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth
degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person
other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof.”89 Intent is the first
element of the crime, therefore individuals that are bona fide purchasers would be protected from

Licata 12

this crime since they are unaware they are possessing stolen property. California’s statute of
theft is similar to New York’s for larceny. The statute reads:
Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal
property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been
entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or
fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or
personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth
or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby
fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or
service of another, is guilty of theft. 90
Similar to New York, California’s statute requires intentionally taking another’s property without
permission in some manner, including deceitfully or fraudulently taking the property.91
State statutes afford trademark protection which range from first to the third degree. A
person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree when, with the “intent to deceive
or defraud some other person or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale,
offering for sale, or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for
sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be
counterfeit for the purpose of affixing it to any goods.” 92 A parallel may be drawn here in
relation to affixing fake labels to art works.93 Those individuals guilty of fraudulently affixing
labels to art works known to be fake may be infringing upon the MoMA’s trademark in those
labels. This protection would be insufficient to protect wronged consumers on the immoral end a
deal because the cause of action rests with the MoMA, and not with the average consumer.
IV.

Federal and State Application of Current Laws
a. Federal application
Several claims may be asserted against sellers of counterfeit art. However, a vast

majority of these causes of actions do not afford the buyer of fake art complete relief. Several
federal and state statutes purport to protect against art forgery. However, none of them provide
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the artist with adequate relief, criminally or civilly. There is no uniform method of punishing the
sale of forged art. Within the existing copyright laws, trademark laws, and laws governing
goods, a victim of art forgery must marry themselves to the statute most likely to provide relief.
Art forgers recognize these asymmetries and frequently are able to slip through the wellestablished cracks. For example, if one is the rightful owner of a work of art but not of its
copyright, that individual may only bring claims based on the fact that the art work is a good and
therefore must rely on only the U.C.C. for protection. The owner would not be able to bring a
claim based in copyright infringement because that owner does not own the copyright to the
work, he only owns the physical good.
Another issue an artist may face is a work for hire dispute. In a work for hire contract,
the artist agrees to create a work for the hiring party, preserving the copyright in the hiring party,
in exchange for compensation.94 According to 17 U.S.C §101, a work made for hire is a “work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or a work specially ordered
or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work….”95 If an artist is hired by a
patron of the arts to create a work, the copyright of that work belongs to the patron, and not the
artist. The hiring patron would have a copyright interest in that work of art if it were to be
counterfeited and then later sold. If the artist is an independent contractor and not an employee
of the patron, it is more difficult to ascertain who the rightful owner of the copyright is. The
artist will argue he is not an employee of the patron and the work was not specially
commissioned, resulting in him owning the copyright. The patron will argue first that the artist
is his employee and in the alternative that the patron specially commissioned the work, making
the Patron the rightful owner of the copyright.
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A looming issue of utilizing intellectual property law to combat the sale of forged art
exists. A juxtaposition exists between using intellectual property laws and classifying art work as
a good. Intellectual property is not considered a “good” and therefore not afforded protection
under the Uniform Commercial Code. Two different types of claims are available when bringing
a claim for art forgery: intellectual property claims infringement and goods. If one chooses to
bring a claim under an intellectual property statute, the claim would be who owns the copyright
or trademark. However, for those individuals who do not own the copyright or trademark, a
U.C.C. claim may be the proper channel and, in fact, the intellectual property statutes afford no
protection to a rightful owner of a work, even if that counterfeit work of art infringes on a
copyright owned by a third party.
Copyright infringement should include specific punishments, criminal and civil for art
forgery. The statute must outline parameters as to what constitutes infringement and what
specifically does not constitute infringement. To establish copyright infringement several factors
include: whether the defendant had access to the copyrighted work prior to the creation of the
defendant’s work and whether a substantial similarity exists in the idea and expression between
the copyrighted work and defendant’s work. Jurisdictions have different tests in establishing a
copyright infringement claim.
Two popular jurisdictions that litigate several copyright claims include the Second and
Ninth Circuits. In the Ninth Circuit, intrinsic and extrinsic fairness tests are applied to determine
whether copyright infringement occurred whereas in the Second Circuit, the ordinary observer
test is used to determine if infringement has occurred. The Ninth Circuit describes intrinsic
fairness as whether the two works’ “total concept and feel” are substantially similar and the
extrinsic test compares specific, objective criteria on the basis of several elements such as
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setting, plot, characters, etc. or in the case of art work, the elements present in the painting,
perhaps the subject matter portrayed.96 If the Ninth Circuit found that two works of art were
substantially similar in feel and concept then that fact may be enough evidence to maintain a
copyright infringement action. Again, there are issues with bringing a copyright infringement
claim. First, the plaintiff must actually hold the copyright. Second, the intrinsic and extrinsic
fairness tests were designed to gauge similarities in movies and books, not necessarily art work.
It is possible that a court would stretch the factors to incorporate art works if presented with a
persuasive enough argument.
The Second Circuit’s test of substantial similarity asks if an ordinary observer would be
“disposed to overlook the [similarities] and regard the aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as the
same.”97 The Second Circuit would gauge if an ordinary reasonable observer would regard the
offensive work as aesthetically the same as the original plaintiff’s work. Since only expressions
of ideas are copyrightable and ideas themselves are not copyrightable,98 and the art work itself is
an expression of an idea aesthetic element is incorporated into the copyright infringement test.
Federal trademarks are designated with this symbol: “®” and common law trademarks
are simply marked “TM.”99 Registration is not required to maintain trademark protection. The
three functions of a trademark include: to identify the source of the commercial object, guarantee
the constancy of quality, and advertise the manufacturer and attract customers.100 Trademark
claims may be a superior vessel to combat art forgery since intent is not a prerequisite to liability
as in copyright infringement cases. Trademarks are significant to artists because trademarks
facilitate and evoke a specific perception by the artists’ admirers. Buyers know that when they
see “Picasso” signed across the bottom of a painting that they are purchasing a certain quality art
work. However, a person’s image or likeness cannot function as a trademark, but his or her
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name may possibly.101 Even if Picasso’s face graced the bottom of his art work, that picture of
his face would generally not be trademarkable. Picasso’s name evokes a specific perception, a
visceral feeling that is associated with Picasso. An individual knows that Picasso’s works are
worth millions of dollars, that the art work comes with a certain level of prestige, and that the art
work was created in a certain time period.
In the Southern District of New York, a plaintiff seeking damages for a trademark
infringement claim must show that “…[E]ither 1) the challenged advertisement is literally false
or 2) while the advertisement is literally true, it is nevertheless likely to mislead or confuse
consumers.”102 Art forgers, no doubt, intend to cause confusion to the unsuspecting buyer.
However, the challenge in proving a trademark infringement case is twofold. First, the plaintiff
bringing the suit must own the trademark to the work. Second, typically the artists’ signatures on
the work of art itself are not sufficient to constitute trademarkable material. This cause of action
would only be successful if the plaintiff holds a registered trademark on the work of art and that
work of art is trademarkable under the statute.
The Lanham Act is applied to trademark infringement cases.103 Trademarks allow
customers to identify the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or a provided of a service.104
Section 43 of the Lanham Act provides any person in connection with any goods using a work,
symbol or any false designation of origin, false or misleading the description of fact which is
likely to cause confusion by another person in commercial advertising.105 Essentially, if a
trademark is misleading and promotes confusion as to that registered trademark, it is a violation
under the Lanham Act. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits false advertising the use of
the author’s name in connection with a work in which the author’s true participation or
contribution is misrepresented.106 In the earlier example where the artist signed a blank paper to
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be used as an authorized reproduction only, the defendant would be liable under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. The author’s true contribution would be misrepresented as the prints being sold
as if they were originals when they really are simply authorized reproductions.
b. State Protections
To utilize state protections, the typical direction a plaintiff must take is that the art work
is a “good.” These state protections stem from the fact that the art work is a good. Plaintiffs
may choose to employ a state claim over a federal intellectual property claim for the simple
reason that they do not own the intellectual property rights associated with the art. For example,
artist A retains all copyright interest for the next 70 years and sells the work to Sotheby’s.
Sotheby’s then sells the artwork for $10 million dollars to buyer B. However, during the time
which Sotheby’s was storing the art work, a disgruntled employee stole the original work of art
and replaced it with a well-executed copy. When buyer B asserts a claim against Sotheby’s he
would have no intellectual property claims because B does not own a copyright or trademark to
the art work as the artist retained those rights. Buyer B is left with the ability to assert several
claims under state law, including claims supported by the U.C.C., the Consumer Fraud Act, and
common law breach of contract.
The U.C.C. was adopted by each state as a method of streamlining commercial
transactions. Prior to the adoption, most transactions were governed by “the law merchant,”107
which simply was the collective interpretation of how sales should operate according to
merchants in the business of selling a particular good.108 Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs the sale
of goods. Since art work is a good, Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies. In the aforementioned
hypothetical, buyer B is not the copyright or trademark owner, therefore, the best claim he can
make is buttressed by the Uniform Commercial Code. First, there must be some type of breach
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of contract. A contract109 is a legally enforceable agreement. A breach occurs when one or both
parties deviate from the agreed upon contract.110 Within the agreement, obligatory express and
implied warranties apply to the contract. U.C.C. §2- 312, Warranty of Title and Against
Infringement, is one example of an implied warranty. Sotheby’s gave an implied warranty that
the work sold to buyer B is authentic because of Sotheby’s reputation, and the price at which the
auction house sold the work of art.
The U.C.C. defines “genuine” as “free of forgery or counterfeiting.”111 An individual
paying $10 million dollars for a work of art assumes that the work is genuine, and that is part of
the basis of negotiation for that contract. If the work is not authentic, that automatically should
preclude a legally binding agreement based on a litany of claims.
Buyer B could argue that he never accepted the art work. However, since he bought it at an
auction that may be a difficult argument. Alternatively, buyer B could revoke his acceptance.
Another colorable claim by the buyer lies within U.C.C. § 2-513(3). This section applies
when there is a “Cash on Delivery” (“C.O.D.”) situation. Here, the buyer had to pay Sotheby’s
before inspecting the good, unless the defect was overtly detectable (if for example the Picasso
had been drawn in crayon). Since the buyer did not have an opportunity to inspect the good,
mere payment does not constitute acceptance under U.C.C. § 2-606. A buyer, who pays for the
goods in C.O.D setting before inspecting, must do so and therefore will not suffer the adverse
consequences of acceptance. If the court agrees that an auction is a C.O.D. situation then the
buyer will be found to have rejected the good, and therefore will not be bound by the contract.
If the good is non-conforming or if the good is counterfeit, the buyer's remedial
entitlements depend on whether the buyer has accepted or not. If the buyer has not accepted,
then the buyer can reject under U.C.C. § 2-601 to § 2-605 and be entitled to the remedies
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provided in § 2-712, § 2-713, § 2-715, § 2-716. The remedies range from the seller replacing the
good to what damages the plaintiff is entitled.112 Under §2-602 if the buyer seasonable notifies
the seller of rejection, that precludes acceptance.113 If the buyer has accepted then the buyer
cannot reject and must try to revoke his acceptance. The buyer can attempt to revoke under
U.C.C. § 2-608 and if he can do so, then the buyer is put in the same place as if he rejected the
good in the first place. If revocation is not available, then B is left with the sole remedy of
money damages under U.C.C. § 2-714 and U.C.C. § 2-715.
The standard for revocation is very high because the buyer must show substantial
impairments in value to him personally on a subjective standard and the buyer must further
demonstrate one of three situations in addition to substantial impairment: (1) On a reasonable
assumption that nonconformity would be cured and it was not cured, (2) if when acceptance was
reasonable at the time, but now because of a latent defect it is no longer acceptable (3) Seller's
repeated assurances.114 B's acceptance was induced by S's aggressive assurances which deprived
Buyer of meaningful opportunity for B to discover the defect. In this hypothetical, there would
be substantial impairment to the buyer, since he spent $10 million dollars on this counterfeit
work of art. However, the second requirement is more difficult to prove. The best argument
would be the second alternative, that acceptance was reasonable at the time because both the
buyer and Sotheby’s reasonably thought this work of art was authentic and it was not found until
later that the art work was actually an outstanding, worthless copy.
As noted, the U.C.C. contains a host of sections that create some liability for the seller
and some remedy for the wronged buyer. However, the sections are geared to goods that are
regularly bought and sold on the market and can be easily replaced as opposed to very expensive
and seldom transferred goods, such as a multi-million dollar work of art that is a one of a kind.
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In the hypothetical, it might prove difficult if not impossible to cure this counterfeit art situation
since this work is the only one of its kind. In order for Sotheby’s to cure this problem, the
auction house would have to find the original work to replace the fake. Sotheby’s would most
likely end up refunding the buyer’s purchase price and may be liability for other damages under
breach of contract.
These works deserve an appropriately tailored statute creating liability, especially for
intentional art forgers. If the art forger intentionally and actively attempts to create and sell
forged works, the punishment should be swift, harsh, and liability should be simple to impose.
Liability should be less harsh for defendants of unintentional forgeries, similar to that in music
infringement cases. Of course, counterfeiting occurs on a much smaller basis as well, which
often makes “the juice not worth the squeeze.” In other words, the small nature of the offensive
material does not make prosecution worth the resources. This lack of enforcement of these
statutes leads the forgers to continue their inapt behavior.
If a buyer spends $300 on an “original” work that is later discovered to have been forged,
the attorney’s fees alone make pursing this claim unreasonable. Therefore, the only plaintiffs
that would enjoy any type of relief are those that spend an extravagant amount of money on a
work of art. Another recommendation would be to have the legislature craft a statute that would
allow a simple class action suit against the defendant. Therefore, everyone who spends $300 on
an “original” work of art would aggregate into a class and thus stand a chance at pursuing relief.
These are examples of civil liability. Where there is a breach of contract claim or any claim
promulgated by the U.C.C., it provides a civil private right of action.
V.

Levels of Deceit: Criminal and Civil
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“The goal of criminal law is to punish bad acts, whereas civil causes of action enforce the
rights of private parties through compensation.”115 Civil claims are to remedy private disputes
between two parties because of harm done directly to that plaintiff. The remedies in civil cases
typically range from monetary damages to put the aggrieved party in the place they were before
the contract and specific performance, which gives the party exactly what they bargained for.116
Criminal claims are brought by the state government or federal government against a defendant
as a crime against the community as a whole. The remedies in criminal cases typically range
from monetary compensation to time served in prison. Usually, criminal liability does not
preclude civil liability. Thus, a statute crafted should allow for both remedies, if needed.
a. Real Life Applications and Examples
Frequently, fake art turns up with most respected art dealers as well as on eBay. It may
be argued that the well-established art dealer situation is more troubling than that of a novice
buyer. First, if patrons are spending an extravagant amount of money on a piece of art, they will
most likely hire an independent expert to authenticate the work. At the same time, because
patrons are paying such a high price for the art work, the sophisticated, experienced art buyers
may rely to their detriment simply on the dealer’s reputation. After all, how could Sotheby’s sell
someone a fake work of art? In October 2000, Sotheby's, “the world's largest art auction house,
ha[d] been under investigation for alleged price-fixing and securities fraud.” 117 In October of
2000, Sotheby's former President and CEO, Diana Brooks, pled guilty to price-fixing.118 Diana
Brooks was sentenced to probation, 1000 hours of community service, 6 months house arrest,
and ordered to pay a $350,000 fee after being found guilty of colluding with Christie’s to fix
commission prices.119
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Another high-powered Sotheby’s employee received a harsher sentence after being
implicated by Diana Brooks. In 2001, A. Alfred Taubman, the former chairman of Sotheby's
Holdings was convicted of price-fixing, sentenced to a year and a day in prison and fined $7.5
million dollars.120 Taubman maintained his innocence even after serving his sentence and
claimed Diana Brooks lied to mitigate her crime.121
Another prominent and once respected art dealer, Larry Salander was found guilty of
grand larceny and ordered to pay $114 million dollars in restitution for selling artwork he did not
own and pocketing the profit himself.122 Salander was entrusted with millions of dollars’ worth
of art work and then sold it without permission and kept the proceeds.123 Salander made a
statement to the court and the victims of his crime and the defense introduced evidence of mental
health problems on behalf of Salander.124
Another art dealer in Los Angeles, Matthew Taylor, was arrested and accused of money
laundering, possession of stolen property and transportation of stolen property and is facing 100
years in prison if convicted. 125 “Prosecutors say Taylor also affixed on some paintings fake
labels from museums, such as the Guggenheim in New York, to make it appear the works had
once been part of the collections at those institutions.”126
More recently in 2012, a group of impressionist paintings that have been in circulation in
the art world for years were deemed fake.127 “The [FBI] has been investigating at least two
dozen paintings supplied by a Long Island dealer named Rosales and sold by Knoedler and
another New York dealer.128 The works are attributed to Modernist masters like Rothko, Jackson
Pollock, Franz Kline, Willem de Kooning and others, but several experts have called them
forgeries.”129 The defendant maintains that the works are authentic, however. In addition,
another instance of crime was a mixture of selling counterfeit art and stealing an original art
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work. A museum in Venezuela was contacted by a Miami Gallery indicating that someone had
offered to sell the Gallery the painting Odalisque in Red Pants by Matisse.130 “Experts at the
museum inspected the likeness [in Venezuela] and were shocked to find that it was a
fake…Someone had removed the original painting from its frame and put the fake in its place,
leaving it to be exhibited as if it were the real thing. And no one noticed.” 131
One art forger, John Myatt, was complicit in selling fake art on a much smaller scale.
John Myatt, a single father, living in England, plead guilty to fraud and served four months in
prison. Myatt made about $144,000 during this time.132 Myatt started creating works of art
commissioned by friends for a fee.133 Then he was contacted by Drewe and he asked Myatt to
paint some works for his own personal use.134 Then, without notice, Drewe passed one work off
to Christie’s successfully without Myatt’s consent.135 Myatt painted about 200 works of art,
while the operation was maintained by John Drewe, who was sentenced to six years in prison
and made about $2.4 million dollars during the operation.136 John Drewe handled all of the sales
as well as the forged provenances, the chain of ownership that should accompany each valuable
work of art.137
As time went on, Myatt was ignorant as to how Drewe was providing him with this
money support his family. An interesting caveat to this story is the fact that his fakes were
unable to be detected for such an extended period of time. Not only were the materials used
inauthentic for the time period they were supposed to be painted in, the provenances were forged
and also remained undetected.138 This is troubling since not even a large auction house like
Christie’s was able to detect the forgery. These are all large scale art forgeries and
understandably there have been consequences including jail time and monetary compensation.
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b. Proposed Federal Statute
Despite the remedies for those swindled out of substantial amounts of money, no
adequate remedies exist for those conned out of more modest amounts. The federal legislature
may be able to remedy this problem by constructing a statute that makes counterfeit art a strict
liability offense and by imposing a financial statutory cap that would limit the reach of this strict
liability statute. For example, the criminal misdemeanor statute could read “[A]ny person who
creates, sells, or auctions counterfeit or non-genuine art for $500 or less is strictly liability to the
purchaser to the extent of the purchaser’s initial investment, up to five (5) times the amount of
the purchaser’s initial investment but in no case less than double the amount originally sold for,
and a maximum of 1 year in prison.” This would protect the average, unsophisticated art buyer
and allow for a remedy that would not require an unreasonable amount of attorney or expert fees.
The guidelines for handing down criminal sentences must be refined for larger offenses
as well. As the valued amount of the work of art increases so should the punishments, however,
intent must be introduced as a factor. Strict liability should not be imposed if the statute outlines
harsh penalties. The felony statute should read “[A]ny person who knowingly or recklessly sells
or auctions counterfeit or non-genuine art for more than $500 shall be liable to the purchaser to
the extent of the purchaser’s initial investment, plus a fine up to five (5) times the purchaser’s
investment, but in no case less than double the amount originally sold for, and prison time
minimum one (1) year to maximum twenty (20) years.” Judges should have clear guidelines in
imposing sentences on convicted of selling or creating forged art. Perhaps these unambiguous
punishments will act as enough of a deterrent that they will discourage selling forged art. The
crime of selling forged art must ripen into a low-reward, high-risk crime in order to effectively
stop this crime.
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As seen above, many individuals, in a position of power also succumb to breaking the
law. The reasons for this may be purely speculative; however, one may suggest greed is the
number one motivating factor. Most disturbing is a high powered person, entrusted with art
work, taking advantage of innocent consumers. Common criminals are one group of people that
are punished for selling counterfeit art. Is Diana Brooks, former CEO of Sotheby’s, a common
criminal? It strikes a nerve when considering Ms. Brooks’ position of power being used for a
criminal purpose, to defraud innocents. One may expect that behavior from a “common
criminal,” perhaps desperate for money to feed his family, like John Myatt. Diana Brooks was
not desperate for money; she was not on the brink of poverty, yet she defrauded people out of
millions of dollars. Of course the reason for committing a crime should be irrelevant, often
Judges do take this information into account but it may provide for some leniency. One may fail
to see the commonality and justification as to why Diana Brooks received the sentence she did.
Three months house arrest, a $350,000 fine, community service, and probation hardly seem
appropriate for conspiracy that cost people collectively millions of dollars.
A common theme here is that people entrusted with these precious art works yield to
greed. Perhaps if the law provided a stronger deterrent and imposed a higher standard of care on
these individuals, less fraud and conspiracy would take place. This standard would be similar to
those of financial advisories who have a fiduciary duty to their clients. These advisors are
entrusted with client’s money and are expected to behave morally. Similarly, the CEO of
Sotheby’s is entrusted with items of high monetary and cultural value. These individuals are put
in a position where their decisions can have long range consequences and they should have to be
held responsible for that privilege. The CEO of Sotheby’s has the ability to defraud the public
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out of millions of dollars where as a private vendor on eBay would not be able to gross that high
amount of profit without detection, or so one would hope.
VI.

Conclusion: “Those who do not want to imitate anything, produce nothing.-Dali
Art forgeries may be prosecuted federally, by the state, criminally and civilly with

permutations of each of the previous four categories. Despite the vast array of existing legal
heroism aimed to prevent art forgery and guidelines to remedy it, the question must be
articulated, is this enough? Obviously, art work cannot and is not produced in a vacuum. For
thousands of years, artists have been inspired by each other’s work, always attempting to add an
extra creative element somewhere. Dali’s quote above exemplifies this in the sense that
imitation in art work is perfectly acceptable, but brazen, brush stroke for brush stroke copying
and reselling a work of art for pecuniary gain is not acceptable. Those who do the latter should
have to face devastating consequences.
An analogy to forgery in the art world is “biting” in the hip hop world. Biting is simply
copying another artist’s work whether it is music or lyrics without giving proper credit.139 Of
course there are legal ramifications that entitle an artist to monetary or injunctive relief under a
copyright infringement statute. However, the consequences of biting extend further than the
legal consequences to social failure. If an artist is even accused of biting, that artist will suffer
irreparable social consequences and lose all respect from other members of the community for
this offense.140
Regardless of which industry the forgery stems from, there is one critical, central take
away: liability or punishment is proper and must be imposed to remedy this great moral failure.
A balance must be struck between the punishment and the offense, whether it is criminal or civil,
state or federal. Imposing a federal statute such as the one proposed earlier, would greatly deter
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criminals from selling forged art and would transform the crime of counterfeiting art from a lowrisk, high-reward crime into a high-risk, low-reward crime.
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